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By Professor Roscoe Pound.
The Two Ideas of Law.'
A developed body of law is made up of two chief elements, the
enacted or imperative element and the traditional or habitual
element. The former is the modern element, and so far as the
form of the law is concerned it is tending to become predominant.
The latter is the older or historical element, upon which juristic
development of the law proceeds by analogy. In the process of time
legislation becomes absorbed in this elemeht of the legal system
and the enacted rule becomes a traditional principle1 Accord-
ingly there is a gradual transformation of the first element into
the second. On the other hand, as the traditional element is
developed by judicial experience and juristic science and its prin-
ciples are worked out into detailed rules, these rules are given
imperative form by legislation, so that there is a gradual trans-
formation of the traditional into the imperative.1 The traditional
* All rights reserved.
1 The substance of this paper -will appear in a forthcoming book, to be
entitled "Sociological Jurisprudence." The general idea which it presents
and some part of the argument was get forth in a paper entitled "A New
School of Jurists," Nebraska University Studies, IV, 249 (1904).
2 For instance, English statutes prior to colonization, and to some
extent those prior to the Revolution, are part of our American common
law in the form in which they were "construed" at the Revolution. Spauld-
ing v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 30 Wis., 111. The older statutes are
part of the common law as they were worked into it by Coke. In the
same way some American statutes which obtain in many jurisdictions, and
hlence have become the subject of commentary, are becoming part of the
common law, e. g. homestead and exemption laws in the Western States,
and to some extent the federal mining statutes. (-The Statute of Frauds
and the Statute of Limitations are conspicuous examples of statutes that
'have taken their place in the body of the common law./ Compare a like
phenomenon in Roman law: "As for the statutory enactments of the
republic and the senatus consults of the early empire, these had long
ceased to be referred to as authoritative monuments of legislation; they
were recognized only in the form in which they had been embodied in the
writings of the juris-consults, and were regarded as part of the jus, or
jurisprudential law rather than of the leges or statute law." Muirhead,
Historical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome, §84 (2 ed., p. 378).
Lb Examples may be seen in the English Bills of Exchange Act and
Sales of Goods Act, and in the Negotiable Instruments Law, Uniform
Sales Act and the like in the United States.1
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.element rests at first upon the usage and practice of tribunals or
the usage and customary modes of advising litigants on the part
.of those upon whom tribunals rely for guidance.4 Later it comes
to rest upon juristic science and the habitual modes of thought of
.a learned profession. .Thus the basis of its authority comes to be
reason and conformity to ideals of right.' On the other hand
the imperative element rests upon enactment; upon the expressed
will of the sovereign. The basis of its authority is the power of
the state." In consequence of these two elements of developed
legal systems and of the different bases upon which their authority
rests, two distinct ideas of law are to be found throughout the
history of juristic science. Corresponding to' these ideas and
corresponding to the two elements in the law, two distinct words,
originally expressing two distinct ideas, are to be found in most
languages spoken by peoples among whom law has reached any
great development. The one set of words (ius, Recht, droit,
diritto, derecho) has particular reference to the idea of right and
justice. The leading notion in this set of words is ethical. Hence
these words have three meanings.. First they mean right, that
which accords with our ethical ideas. Second they mean a right,
moral or legal, that is a capacity which the moral sense of the
community or the power of the State confers in order to bring
about right.7 Third they come to mean law; that is a system of
principles or body of rules designed to enforce rights. an& bring
about right. In other words, each of this set of words means
primarily right and refers to the idea of right and justicei but
4 The interpretatio of the us civile during the Roman republic may be
instanced. Dig. I, 2, 2, §§5, 6. See Voight, Das Ius Naturale, Aequum et
3Bonum und lus Gentium der Rbmer, 111,287 ff., where many examples are
collected.
5 "For reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself e is noth-
ing else but reason." Co. Lit. 97 b. "The common law is the absolute
perfection of reason; for nothing that is contrary to reason is consonant
to law." Wood, Institute of the Laws of England, Introduction (1722).
"The word law is used in many senses. One sense is when that "which is
always equitable and just is called law, as for instance, natural law."
Paul in Dig. I, 1, 11, pr. This phase of law is the one looked at by the
-historical and the philosophical jurists.
0 Cf. the dictum of Hobbes that authority, not truth makes the law.
English Works, II, 185; VI, 26.
7 In German a right is subjektives Recht, law (right) is objektives
Rechi. See Schuppe, Der Begriff des subjektiven Rechts, §1; Arndts,
Jutristische Encyklop-idie, §§10-11.
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is used to mean law in general. It is appropriate to periods of
legal history in which law is formative or is expanding and devel-
oping through juridical speculation or some other non-imperative
agency. The other set of words (lex, Gesetz, loi, legge, ley)
refers primarily to that which is enacted or set authoritatively,
but tends to mean law as a whole. It is appropriate to periods
of enacted law and to periods of legal history in which the grow-
ing-point of law is in legislation. As now one and now the other
of the elements of which law is made up has prevailed, now one
and now the other name has come to be used for the whole. The
classical period of Roman law was marked by juristic rather than
by legislative activity, and the classical period of the modern
Roman law was similarly characterized. Hence the predomi-
nance of ius and its equivalents in the languages of Continental
Europe. On the other hand in England, where a strong central
authority took the administration of justice in hand from an
early period and the executive legislation of the royal writs
created a vigorous system, which attained fixity before juristic
speculation was sufficiently advanced to exert an influence, law,
a word of the second type,' became the general term, and right
never acquired more than an ethical signification.
A similar double series is to be observed in the formulas in
which jurists have expressed their conceptions of law. The two
sets of words of which ins and lex respectively are the types repre-
sent two ideas between which definitions of law have oscillated
according to the circumstances of legal systems and the agencies
through which their rules have been expressed for the time being.
Greek and Roman Definitions.
As the definition of law has been the battle ground of juris-
prudence, there is no way in which the. history of the conception
of law may be set forth more strikingly or more concisely than by
examining the-formulas by which jurists have attempted to
express their conceptions and set forth their conclusions. In a
sense the first formulas we should consider in such an examina-
tion are Roman, for "in the history of the world the Romans
realized the idea of law first and in a peculiar degree."'  But
the first Roman definitions of law are founded upon Greek origi-
8 Etymologically, however, it is of the first type. Clark, Practical
Jurisprudence, 67-70.
9 Stahl, Philosophie des Rechts, , §96.
THEORIES OF LAW
nals. Hence we may well begin by looking at Greek law and
Greek definitions of law as determined thereby.
Greek law was built upon the small body of institutions com-
mon to .Aryan peoples. The Greeks developed this body of
institutions in such a way as to get from the stage of primitive
law into the stage of strict law,'" but no further except as in
Athens the wide discretionary power of the popular tribunals
introduced a certain crude equity.1 ' Accordingly Greek law
developed three successive forms. The first was the primitive
form of decisions of the king, regarded as divinely inspired.'
12  In
its second form, law was a tradition of an oligarchy. From a
priestly tradition, it became a tradition known only to a class, a
body of customary rules of decision possessed as a class tradition
by an oligarchy.1 3 The third form was brought about by popular
demand for publication of the law, which resulted in a body of
enacted law. At first this was no more than declaratory. From
publication of established custom, however, it was an easy step
to publication of changes as if they were the established custom,
and thence to conscious and avowed changes by legislation.
Solon's laws mark this stage of true legislation at Athens, just
as Alfred's dooms do in Anglo-Saxon law.'" Hence after Solon,
101 take the stages of legal development to be (1) 'brimitive law, the
beginning of law, (2) the strict law, (3) the stage of equity or natural
law, (4) the maturity of law.
11 Kohler brings this out well, comparing Greek law and Anglo-Amer-
ican law with Roman law and modern German law. Geleitwort to Rogge,
Methodologische Vorstudien zu einer Kritik des Rechts, p. iii. See also
Aristotle, Politics, III, 16.
12 Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes, 1-56; Maine, Ancient Law,
chap. 1.
12 Maine, Ancient Law, chap. 1; Leist, Graeco-Italische Rechtsge-
schichte, §§63 ff.
14 Leist, Graeco-Italische Rechtsgeschichte, §§70 ff., particularly 76.
Leist cites upon this point Plutarch's story of Solon, who, being asked if
he had given the Athenians the best laws, answered, "Yes, the best they
would accept." Solon, chap. 15. Compare the prologue to -Alfred's Laws:
"I, then, Alfred, king, gathered these together and Commanded many of
those to be written which our forefathers held, those which seemed to me
good: and many of those which seemed to me not good, I rejected them
by the counsel of my witan and in other wise commanded them to be
holden, for I durst not venture to set down in writing much of my own."
Thorpe's transl., Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, 1, 59.
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the law of Athens purported to be a conscious product of human
wisdom. But philosophers had begun to inquire as to the rela-
tion of laws so constituted to the ideas of right and wrong. Was
an act right, they asked, because it conformed to law, or were
both the act and the law right if and in so far as they coincided
with an absolute and eternal standard above the law?t One
answer was that what corresponded to the latter standard was
natural right, but what corresponded only with the humanly-
imposed legal standard was conventional right, while others held
that justice rested upon enactment rather than upon nature.",
Thus we have two ideas in Greek thought concerning law; on
the one hand the idea of law as human wisdom, ascertained and
promulgated through the State, on the other hand the idea of law
as the manifestation of an immutable and eternal right and jus-
tice. In other words, the idea of lex and the idea of ius. This
double aspect of Greek thinking about law is due to the circum-
stance that Greek law in the classical period was in form a body
of enactment, but was about to grow by development through
philosophical speculation. Greek jurists, however, did not arise
to develop the law in this way. Instead Roman jurists put the
ideas of the Greek philosophers into practical effect."-
Greek definitions of law, accordingly, are sometimes definitions
of enacted law,"8 sometimes attempts to formulate the rational or
l Compare Socrates in Xenophon, Memorabilia, IV, 5-15 (e. g. IV,
12, "for I say that which is legal is just"), with Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics, V, 7, 1: "Of the politically just, one part is natural and the other
legal. The natural is that which everywhere is equally valid, and does
not depend on being or not being received. But the legal is what origi-
nally was indifferent, but having been enacted, is so no longer."
16 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 10-15, Nicomachean Ethics, V, 14. Also the
Stoic doctrine as stated by Diogenes Laertius, vii, 128: "They say that the
just exists by nature and not by enactment." On the other hand, Aris-
tippus, quoted by Diogenes Laertius, ii, 93: "That nothing is just or good
or base by nature, but by law and convention."
17 See Zeller, History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy (Alleyne's
transl.). 14 ff.
is,.What the ruling part of the State enacts after considering what
ought to be done, is called law." Xenophon, Memorabilia, I, 2, §43. "Law
is a definite statement according to a common agreement of the State,
giving warning how everything ought to be done." Anaxamines, quoted
by Aristotle, Rhetoric to Alexander, I. These definitions should be com-
pared with the formulas of recent writers in a period of legislation.
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plilosophical basis of law resting on the authority of intrinsic
reason or conformity to an absolute ideal,10 sometimes combina-
tions of the two.
20
The first attempts at a formula which have come to us from a
Roman jurist or philosopher are to be found in the writings of
Cicero. Cicero lived in a transition period, that of the'ius gen-
tiuwtafter the strict formal law set down. in the Twelve Tables
had been modified profoundly by the praetor's edict, but before
the period of the great jurisconsults) A period of enacted law
had come to an end. A period of juristic speculation was begin-
ning. His formulas, accordingly, savor of each. lHis essay,
De Legibius, purporting to contain the discourse of a jurisconsult
asked to expound his views of the iius civile,21 is in name a dia-
logue on the riles of lau, and he defines not ius but le.. Yet he
does not use lex in the stricter sense of a statute or enacted rule,
as in Capito's well-known f6rmula in the next generation,
2 2 but
gives it the wider meanirg of law: His formulas are doubtless
drawn from or modele*d upon Greek originals. Nevertheless it
is noteworthy that, as he puts them, they have something of the
idea of authority and command, appropriate to the period just
10 "The common law, going through all things, which is the same with
Zcus who administers the whole universe." Chrysippus, quoted by Diog-
enes Laertius, vii, 88.
20 "This is law, which all men ought to obey for many reasons, and
chiefly because every law is both a discovery and a gift of God and a
teaching of wise men, and a setting right of wrongs, intended and not
intended; but also a common agreement of the State, according to which
everyone in the State ought to live." Demosthenes, Against Aristogaton,
774, quoted also by Marcian, Dig. I, 3, 2. Notice the three ideas in this
passage, (1) law as the imperative of the State, (2) law as a decision of
wise men, (3) law as a discovery of the eternally just. - Of course
Athenian dikasts, like Anglo-American jurors, liked to make the law for
the case in hand. Hence Demosthenes, as many modern advocates do,
felt the need of exhorting them to stand by the law and of showing them
why they should do so. Cf. Aristotle's advice to the advocate on this
point, Rhetoric, I, 15. Yet the combination of the two ideas, at a time
when philosophy was inquiring as to the basis of the authority of enacted
rules, is noteworthy.
2
1 De Legibus, i, 4.
22 "A le.r is a general command of the people or of" the plebs, upon
question by the magistrate." Aulus Gellius, X, 20, 2.
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past, and something of the idea of reason and justice, appropriate
to the period just beginning.Z
Passing to the classical jurists in the golden age of juristic
law-making, we find the idea of authority and command has dis-
appeared, and reason and justice, to which the jurists of the time
were striving to make the actual rules of law conform, alone are
insisted upon. Thus Celsus, at the beginning of the second cen-
tury A. D., and Ulpian following him, define law (his) as "the
art of what is right and equitable, ' '2' and the latter defines juris-
prudence as the science of the just and the unjust.25  Paul in like
manner says law (ius) is "that which is always equitable and
right. ' 26 By the middle of the third century, however, the period
of the classical jurists is past. Rescripts of the emperor supplant
responsa of the jurisconsults as the source of private law, and
by the end of the fourth century these rescripts cease to be
authoritative except for those to whom addressed. From the
time of Diocletian (A. D. 284) imperial legislation becomes the
growing point of the law. This period has left no juridical or
philosophical treatise to set forth the current notion of law. But
it can hardly be an accident that the word le., began to mean law
in general during the period of legislation and codification from
Diocletian to Justinian.2 7  An antiquarian revival in the reign of
Justinian preserved the formulas of the classical jurists. But the
Institutes and Digest give us the legal speculation of the second
century, not of the sixth. The ideas of an age when Roman law
was known as a body of enactments are well-illustrated by the
2 "Law (lex) is the right reason of commanding and prohibiting."
De Legibus, i, 5. "Law (lex) is the highest reason, implanted in nature,
which commands what ought to be done and prohibits the contrary." De
Legibus, i, 6. "A just sanction, commanding what is upright and pro-
hibiting the contrary." Philipp. xi, 12.
24 Ars aequi et boni. Dig. I, 1, 1, §1.2
5 Dig. 1, 1, 10, §2.
26 Dig. I. 1, 11, pr.
27 Savigny, Geschichte des r6mischen Rechts im Mittelalter, I, §37.
The first case of its use in this sense is in the Lex Dei, sine Mosaicarum
et Rornanarum Legum Collatio, dating from the end of the fourth century.
In this connection it is interesting to note that while droit, diritto, derecho,
all meaning etymologically that which is straight or right, are equivalents
of ius and are generic terms, and loi, leggo, ley, equivalents of lex, are
properly employed to mean dnactment, legislation or rule, yet loi, legge,
ley, for the same reasons that led to the wider meaning of lex, are more
and more used in the wider sense.
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definitions in the treatise of Isidore of Seville (died 636) 0p the
etymology of words. lie says:
"Fas is divine law (lex), ills is human aw, ILex is g written
enactment. Custorq is usage qppvoved by time gr unwritten law
(lex). Usage, moreover, is a certajin kind of lw (lex)
ipstituted by obseryance, which is held for enactment (.py), when
enacted law is wpntipg. ' 8
In other words, enacted law is the normal type; customary law
is a makeshift to which men reso'-t when the former fails theni, -
This view is @ven. nore pparIet in the writings of the period
prior to the rise gf the school . Bologna. Althongh the classi-
;al formulas for us are repegt4d, they have become empty. _LeT
is the living word, and enactment is obviously felt tq be the true
law.3 9
Dgvgpment of [he C qnceptiolt and Decfiition of, Law from !t?
Revival of Lrgl $Study q1 Bologna to the TigMe of qrothf.
In tracing the gro-wth of t.e conception of law from the ryival
of legal studies at Bologna in the twelfth century tq the time of
Grotius, ye mst bear in mind that tle th~eries pf the tir
"'implied the acceptance of tbree gregt authritips, which might b@
interpreted or applied, bt were not to br q.estionedj-th.
authority of the Bible of Aristotle, alid of Justinign."3' The
Corpus i ( - 'li.a gs legisla ion of the Emp or Jnstinian 4  va§
.supposed to e bindinqg statute law, and was properly to h @eig-
3ated Ir. Ii this belief4 ~jrists were engaged in interpreting
4pd commenting upon the a tthoritatiye te t, so as to fit it to the
2 Brlns, Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui (6 ed.,) II, $..
2" This wa§ a point to bp insisted upop in the perip4 of the Legggq
Barhflorun;. ThIs in a c~pitul ry of 793 %vp rea4: "When lal, (lex) is
wantjpg let qusqtp prpvail, and let no ctlstpm be put dvyr the law."
Capituilary p f Pippiq, Kp g of Italy, xxiii, Walter, corpi§ Iris Ger-
Q For e~xmpe, in the Expositip Termiporum appende to the Eley-
enth-Century Patri Exceptiqpps Legp Romaporup, fter the well-known
forFu.p of Celsus, we read: "Law (gx) is right (ius) enacted by wis
p~rinces." Compare with this, Gaius, I 2: "Moreover laws (iura) con-
sist of statutes (Ijges)," etc. Also in the related Libellus de Verbis
Legalibus: "But all law (ius) consists of statutes and customs. Statute
(lex) is the enactment of princes written for the common good; custom
is unwritten enactment (lex)." Fitting, Juristische Schriften des fruheren
Mittelalters, 164, 181. The absence of any real line between ills and lex,
-so far as the former has more than an ethical meaning, is noteworthy.
3 R;' hie, Natural Rights, 7.
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conditions of the modern world. As the reception of Roman
law proceeded, the law.in Continental Europe was made up of the
Corpus Juris with 'its modern gloss,--which, together wita th
legislation of contemporary sovereigns, was regarded as enacted
law,--and th -etomav law of the various peoples, as it had
developed prior to the revival or reception of the Roman law.
Hence Gratian (about 1150), instead of drawing upon the classi-
cal definitions of ius, turns to the formulas of Isidore, already
quoted, and tells us, substantially in the latter's very words, that
all ius' aasists of enactments and customs; that lex is a written
enactment; and that custom is a certain kind of iuswhich is taken
for les- when enaited law is wanting.3 2  For him, too, enacted
law was the normal type, and customary law a mere makeshift
to which men resorted for want of enactment in order to prevent
failure of justice.
During this period English judges were const'ucting the coin-
mon law of England by developing a judge-made customary law
through interpretation and analogical extension of writs and pre-
cedents. English law was" jii, not lex, although the powerful
central authority behind it gave it the strength of imperative law
and obscured the 'ethical and logical element, usually so promi-
nent in non-legislative systems. But the title De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus, borne both by Glanvill's treatise and by Brac-
ton's, makes it evident that the Continental ideas as to the
nature of law were taken for granted. Indeed, Glanvill (about
1189) feels compelled to consider whether England has laws in
view of the circumstance that the rules administered by the king's
judges are not enacted. 33
The beginning of thz woxement back to the classical theory of
law is. to be seen in the next century, when St. Thomas Aquinas
(1225 or 1227-1274) formulates a theory which, in one way or
another, has been felt in jurisprudence until very recent times.
The Germanic principle that the state was bound to act by law
32 Canons 2-5, dist. I.
3 "For the English laws, although not written, may as it should seem,
and that without any absurdity, be termed laws (since this itself is a law-
that which pleases the prince has the force of law). . . . For if from the
mere want of writing only they should not be considered as laws, then
unquestionably writing would seem to confer more authority upon laws
themselves than either the equity of the persons constituting or the reason
of those framing them." De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae,
Preface (Beames' transl., xi).
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coming in contact with the revived classical idea that the state
exists of natural necessitv for -he ge.eral welfare, toward which
law is but a means, so that the state creates law instead of merely
recognizing it, led men to take up once more the distinction of
natural law and positive law.31 Positive law was the creature of
the sovereign. But all sovereigns were subject to natural law,
and their ematmiets in cpnflict therewith were sintA void,
Thomas Aquinas made over this philosophical theory to bring it
into accord with theology. He divided the old ihs natlrale into
two parts,-a le: aeterna and a lex natyralis,-of which the one
is the "reason of the divine wisdom" governing the whole uni-
verse,"" the other the law of human nature, proceeding ultimately
from God but immediately from human reason, and governing the
actions of men only. Man, he held, being a rational creature,
participates in the eternal reason, so that the mu.si which the lex
aeterna addresses to the rest of creation is ought to him, Thus
that part of the eternal law which man's reason reveals is to be
called na-turl law.80  While this scheme made law a body of
enactments of the supreme law-giver of the universe, and so
properly to be called lex, it took fr poaftiv L% ! Wiracter
of emaztment and made it a mere recogniti a t cJxz iwtatralis,
which was aboye all _human aulhority PT Hence it prepared the
way for the more fiberal notions of the Humanist School of jur-
ists and for the return in the seventeenth century to the classical
conception of reasonableness as the source of -authority in law.
The influence of this theological-philosophical system of jurispru-
dence outlined by Thomas Aquinas may be seen in the formulas
of practical lawyers down to the Reformation, Thus, Fortesue
(between 1453 and 1471), after defining its in the words of the
Digest, defines lex, used in the sense of positive law, as "a holy
sanction (sanctio sancta) commanding what is right and forbid-
ding the contrary," 3 -- that is, a sanction added bY the state t.a
3a Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Maitland'5 transi,),
7.3, 74.
3 Summa Theologiae, 1, 2, qu. 93, art, 1.
36 Summa Theologiae, 1, 2, qu. 91, art. 2.
37 His definition of a law (lex) is: "A certain ordinance of reason
for the common good promulgated by him who has the care of the com-
munity." Summa Theologiae, 1, 2, qu. 90, art. 4.
3 8 De Laudibus Legum Angliae, cap. 3. This goes back to Cicero
(sanctio fitsta, inbens honesta et prohibens contraria, Philipp. xi, 12.) But
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rule of natural law. As this natural law, however, was discov-
erable by reason, the obvious effect of the doctrine was to require
all rules of positive law to be tested by reason, and accordingly
we find in Doctor and Student (before 1523) the significant state-
ment that the law of nature "is called by them that be learned in
the law of England the law of reason.""0 Compare also the for-
mula of Suarez:
"Law (lex) is a common precept, just and stable, sufficiently
promulgated.
40
An example of this theory in action may be seen in an argu-
mrnt of R. Sularez, in discussing the interpretation of a text of
the Roman law:
"A law of nature is a rule of reason. Wherefore a human law
partakes of the reason of law in so far as it is derived from a law
of nature. And if they disagree in anything, there is no law, but
a corruption of law."
4 1
Development of the Conception and Definition of Law from
Grotius to Kant.
Here, as in the case of the theory of justce, a wholly new
period begins with the great work of Grotius (1625). Although,
perhaps, he did no more than give currency to what the expositors
of natural law had worked out already, 2 the result of his book
was to emancipate jurisprudence from theology.43  Soon after-
the choice of this formula and the pious turn given it are significant. Com-
pare Braton, I, 3, where the Digest is followed very closely and ius is
,defined.
3, "The first is the law eternal. The second is the law of nature of
reasonable creatures, the which, as I have heard say, is called by them that
be learned in the law of England, the law of reason." Doctor and Student,
'Introduction, "And this law is raised upon six principal foundations.
1. Upon the law of nature, though we seldom make use of the terms, the
law of nature: but we say that such a thing is reasonable or unreasonable
or against the law of reason," Wood, Institute of the Laws of England,
Introduction.
-40 De Legibus, 1, 1, cap. 12 (1619).
Al Repetitiones.. 272-3 (1558).
42 Hinrichs, Geschichte der Rechts und Staatspricipien seit der Refor-
mation, I, 59.
43 "And, indeed, what we have already said about natural law would
have a certain weight even if we were to concede, what one cannot concede
without the greatest sin, that there is no God or that He gives no care to
human concerns." De Jure Belli et Pacis, Prolegomena, §11. See Lioy,
Philosophy of Right (Hastie's transl.) I, 113.
THEORIES OF LA TV
-ward Herman Conring, the founder of the Germanist School and
in a sense the founder of modern legal history,(in his great work,
De Origine luris Germanici (1643),? overthrew the notion of the
statutory authority of the Corpus luris Civilis in the modern
%vorld.44  He proved that the empire then existing was in no
sense the empire of Augustus and of Justinian, and that the legis-
lation of Justinian had never had and did not have any statutory
authority in Germany. The question then arose, what was the
source of its authority? For no one could doubt that it actually
obtained in the forum. The only answer could be that it had
been received as law and had obtained the force of a customary
law administered in the courts by long-standing usage. One might
still ask, however, what was the philosophical basis of this recep-
tion of Roman law? In answering this question, the seventeenth-
century jurist had before him the theory of natural law, the
theory that the ultimate criterion of the validity of legal rules,
the test by which all legal rules must be tried, was conformity to
natural law. Moreover, as we have seen, Grotius had substituted
a philosophical natural law for the theological natural law of his
predecessors. Instead of being based on authority, natural law
was regarded as founded upon reason. In other words, natural
law ceased to be le.x naturalis, the enactment of a supernatural
legislator, and became once more ius naturale, the dictates of
reason in view of the exigencies of human constitution and of
human society.45  Accordingly positive law came to be regarded
as the application of reason to the civil relations of men, and on
the Continent the Corpus luris Civilis stood as its exponent merely
because of its inherent reasonableness. For instance, D'Aguesseau
(1653-175) says:
"The grand destinies of Rome are not yet accomplished; she
reigns throughout the world by her reason after having ceased
to reign by her authority."4
44 Brunner, Grundziige der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, §64; Stintzing,
Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, 11, 3.
45 Accordingly, where the sixteenth-century jurist began with a theo-
logical disquisition, the seventeenth and eighteenth-century jurist begins
with a discussion of the nature of man and the nature of human society.
See Pufendorf, De Jure Naturali et Gentium, bk. I, chaps. 1-2; Btirlamaqui,
Principles of Natural and Politic Law (Nugent's transl.), I, pt. 1, chaps.
1-2; Wooddesson, Elements of Jurisprudence, Lect. I (Of the Laws of
,ian's Nature) ; Wilson, Law Lectures, chaps. 6-9.
46 Transl. by Kent, Commentaries, I, 516.
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Grotius brings out the new idea of law in his formula:
"A rule of moral actions obliging to that which is right. '4 7
It should be noticed, in the first place, that Grotius does not
define lex, but instead defines hus. From his time forward Con-
tinental jurists, when referring to law in general, use ius or its
equivalent in the modern languages. In the next place, the
words "obliging to that which is right" should be noticed. The
obligation involved in law is regarded as existing only to the extent
that the result is ethical. In other words, it is not the authority
behind the rule which, according to this theory, makes it law, but
the result reached by the rule. Perhaps this statement gives
Grotius and his successors credit for a more teleological view than
they consciously entertained. In that event, it would be more
correct to state their doctrine thus A rule is not law and is not
obligatory because of any physical authority behind it, but because
it coincides and to the extent that it coincides with the rule of
natural law, of which it purports to be an ascertainment, which
rule is a rule of right and justice to be reached through reason
The authority of' legal rules, in this view, rests on inherent reason-
ableness. Finally the obligation of a rule of law and the obliga-
tion of a moral rule, in this view, are essentially the same. In
each case there is an obligation resting upon reason, in that reason
shows us the dictates of right and justice.
Two important consequences flowed from the foregoing theo-
ries. The part they played in the founding and development of
international law is well known.48  Much as it has been criticized,
this confusion of what ought to be with what is has borne the
brunt of making and developing international law.40 In prac-
tice, these theories gave rise to a movement which is entirely com-
parable to the classical period in Roman law, to a period in which
the growing-point of law was to be found in juristic speculation
under the influence of a philosophical theory. Until the rise of
legislation upon the Continent, consequent upon the making over
of the law by the jurists of this period,'the philosophical theory
held the field in jurisprudence/ The idea which was at work in
legal theory and in practice cannot be stated more clearly than in
the formula given by Montesquieu (1748): "Law in general is
417 re jt:re BcJli et Pacis, I, 1, §4.
48 See Maine, International Law, Lect. I.
4. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U. S. 677.
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human reason." ' 0  The great text-wxtiters of the seventeenth
and "eighteenth centuries drew their theories directly or indirectly
from Grotius. But these same civilians furnished a large part
of the inspiration and also of the juristic principles upon which
writeis upon law of the first half of the nineteenth century pro-
ceed in England and in America. (Thus the absolute idea of law,
which prevails so largely in America, comes from Grotius in two
ways. On the one hand it comes through Blackstone and on the
other hand it comes through American publicists in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, who followed the'Dutch and French
publicists and civilians."' *
A consequence of the theories of the Law-of-Nature School
was a movement for legislation. Natural law was regarded as
a body of eternal principles, applicable to all men, at all times,
under all circumstances. It was believed that this body of prin-
ciples as a complete whole might be discovered by human reason.
Hence men conceived that it was not merely their duty to criticize
existing rules with reference to these principles. Even more,
they came to hold, it was a duty to work out completely all the
applications of these eternal principles and put them in the form
of a code. Accordingly about the middle of the eighteenth cen-
tury a strong movement for codification set in,'5 2 the most impor-
tant fruit of which was the French code of 18o4, which served as
the foundation of nearly all Continental codifications down to the
German code, which took effect in 19oo. This movement for
codification and the influence of an age of absolute governments
revived the older conception of law as enactment and brought
about a reaction. The reaction begins, indeed, with Hobbes a
century earlier. Writing in England where there was an efficient
legislature and where the notion of natural law was producing no
practical results because no system of foreign law had been
received which required to be made over, it was natural that
Hobbes should be impressed only with the imperative element.
30L'esprit des lois, 1, chap. 3.
51 Thus in Wilson's Law Lectures (1804), Pufendorf is cited 29 times,
and there are 11 citations of Montesquieu, 10 of Grotius, 10 of Vattel, 14
of Burlamaqui, 6 of Heineccius, and 5 of Rutherforth's Institutes of
Natural Law, an exposition of Grotius. In the first volume of Story on
the Constitution, there are 21 citations of Montesquieu, 19 of Vattel. 6 of
Heineccius, 3 of Burlamaqui, 2 of Grotius and 2 of Rutherford.
52 See Schuster, the German Civil Code, 12 Law Quarterly Rev., 1, 17.
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Probably a stronger reason is to be found in the legislative activity
-of the Commonwealth, which could not fail to affect his thinking.
It must be remembered also that Hobbes conceived of right and
justice as having their origin in the State. It followed that there
could be no criterion above and beyond the authority of the State
'by which to judge of the validity of laws. Accordingly, Hobbes
-says:
"Civil law is to every subject those rules which the common-
wealth hath commanded him . . . to make use of for the dis-
tinction of right and wrong; that is to say of what is contrary and
-what is not contrary to rule." 3
Until Kant, this insistence on the imperative element becomes
-more and more marked. After the Reformation and the practical
breakdown of the Empire, the national idea was growing, and
:national law was more and more an obvious fact. Hence writers
upon the Continent at the end of the seventeenth century were
beginning to use lex for the rules of the civil law in each State,7-.
.and Daguesseau, writing in 1716, defines law thus:
"The exact notion of the word law includes always the idea of
a supreme power which is able to constrain men to submit to it."5
This revival of the older conception of law as enactment, as
has been said, was furthered in the eighteenth century by the
political ideas of a period of absolute governments. In France,
Louis XIV, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, had
codified Roman-French law to no small extent through royal ordi-
liances" A period of legislation was at hand, and the effect may
be seen in French definitions of law in the eighteenth century. For
,example, Burlamaqui defines law in this way:
-, Leviathan, chap. 26. With Hobbes also there is an ethical end. But
-the end does not furnish absolute criteria of the validity of rules as with
.Continental jurists of the School of Natural Law. The nineteenth-century
followers of .Hobbes, logically enough, leave out all reference to the end.
As to the circumstances affecting Hobbes' conception of law, see Maine,
Early History of Institutions (American ed.), 365.
54 "A law (lex) is an enactment by which a superior obliges one sxb-
ject to him to direct his actions according to the command of the former."
Pufendorf, Elementa Iurisprudentiae Universalis, Def. 13 (1762).
55 But compare his discussion of the doctrine that the civil law cannot
derogate from the principles of natural law. Oeuvres, XIII, 528. As he
says, in view of the politics of the time this was a difficult and dangerous
question. Oeuvres, XIV, 617 ff.
50 See Esmein, Cours d'histoire du droit Fran~ais (2 ed.), 785.
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". rule prescribed by the sovereign of a society to his sub--
jects." 5"
Likewise Rousseau, seeing in law "the conditions of civil asso-
ciation," and perceiving that these conditions were controlled by-
a personal sovereign in a highly centralized State, whereas itn his-
view the people were the sole legitimate sovereign, insists uponm
the imperative element. He says:
"Law is the expression of the general will." 58
That is, to Rousseau, the law is an expression not of natural law-
or of eternal principles of right and justice, but simply of the-
general will. Yet his real point was that the organ of expression
of the general will should not be a personal sovereign but insteact
some form of collective popular action.
Nevertheless the seventeenth-century conception persisted irr
juristic writing for several reasons. One was that internationar
law occupied men's minds to no small extent, and there legislation'
and an imperative theory were out of the question. 9  Again,
after all the legislative element in the law of the time, althoughi
conspicuous, was by no means the most importanf. It was not
until after the French code of 18o4 that the imperative theory
obtained the upper hand in French juristic thinking. The devel-
opment of Roman-French law through juristic writing -which cul-
minated in the writings of Pothier was still going on, and was-
going on under the influence of the idea of natural law, 60 Hence
we find many formulas of the seventeenth-century type in the-
eighteenth century.'-
5 Principes de droit nature], I, 8, 2 (1747). The imperative theory
is stated very clearly as to positive law by Wolff, Institutiotles Iurs-
Naturae et Gentium, §1068 (1750).
51 Cqptrat Social, Liv. II, chap. 6 (1762).
o0 Almost without exception, the great juristic treatises of this period,
e. g. those of Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Wolff, Vattel, are i4pon the law of
pature an4 nations.
00 A single extract will show the juristic method of the time: "The-
principles of the Roman laws respecting the different kinds of agreemenlts-
and the distinction between contracts and simple agreements, not being
founded on the law of nature, and being indeed very remote from s:m--
plipity, are not admitted into our law." Pothier, Obligations, pt. I, chap. 1,.
§1 (Evans' transl.).
61 "A rule to which men are obliged to make their moral actions con-
formable." Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, chap. 1, §1 (1754).
The word "obliged" in this formula is ambiguous. It might suggest obli-
gation through the force of the State employed to give effect to the rule.
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Blackstg n pharacteristipally atteippted to combine the two
-notions. He attempted to reconcile the current philosophy of law
with his common ,.ense as a practical lawyer by the simple pro-
ces of stating the results to which they led respectively side by
side without comment. Accordingly he adapted . Ciceronian
formula sp as to make it include both of the ctrrent conceptions.
"A rmle of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme ppwer in a
State, prescribing what is right and prohibiting what ii wrong."0 2
A question arises at once upon this definition. Would Black-
4tone sgy that what is pr-@scribed is right because it is prescribed
pand that what is prohibited is wrqng becausg it is prphibited, or
-did he mean thqt it is presribed, hecaue it js right and prohihited
beca nse it is wrong, and thgt prgscribings are only valid because
.an!d in so far gs they presqribe wjy t is right anld prphibitings only
valid b¢.cau§e and in so far as they prohibit what is wrong? He
-makes no gttempt, to cloose between these txyp conflicting ideas
which wer@ curren t in the legal thinking of his time. He states
-each tleory in detail gnd then fran.les a definition w hich will
include either w.ithout qpywher sUggestiig th"ir inconsistency.To undq~trstand lacls~on.'s nethqd Q !eaping yith controverted
problems, pne should compare his stat@lifent of the extreme yiew
p.s to cloflict between legislation and gtpral laly,13 with his state-
ment as to the pmnipotence of Parlianpt,04 his criticism of i4@
Tl', context shows, however, that this wa§ pot the author's idea, lie
means obliged, not by the force of the State, but by the intrinsic moral
f orcp of the rle.
119 Cojumentaries, 1, 44 (1765).
Gq oqmmentaries, I, 41: "This law of nature . . . is of course
superipr ip obligation to any other. It is binding all over the globe in afi
.countries and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary
to fh.s; g nd suclt of them as are valid derive all their force and all their
authority, iedigtely or immediately from this original." See also 1, 43:
"fUpQfl the§e two foundations, the law of tatur@ and the law of revelatiop,
depet all humnp laws; that is to say, no human law should be suffere
to co.tradipct the. There are, it is true, a grt number pf indifferent
poit1s ip which both the diyipe law and the na pr.l leaye a map p
lis wpn libertyl but which are found necessary for the benefit pf
-society to be restrained l¥ithin certain limits. And herein it is that hutan
laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for, lyith regard to. such ppilts
:as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of and act in
subordination to ihe former."
14 Compare with the foregoing: "The power and jurisdiction of Par-
liament, says Sir Edward Coke, is so transcendent and absolute, that it
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theory of a state of nature"5 with his scheme of rights founded
thereon,6" and his curious juxtaposition of utilitarianism iand
Grotian natural law.0 7  The reasons why Blackstone was tnable
to choose between the two theories are not far to seek. His
situation was not unlike that of Cicero, who, as we have seen, did
much the same thing. At the revolution of 1688, Parliament
became sovereign in the English polity. No authority thereafter
could question the absolute supremacy of Parliament or the abso-
lutely binding force of its enactments upon every Englishman and
upon every English tribunal. At the same time the great bulk
of English law was traditional rather than imperative in charac-
ter. The imperative element was hardly noticeable in the private
law of the time. In the actual admifiistration of justice, the
traditional element held almost the whole field. Moreover, a
philosophical theory substantially the same as that which obtained
-upon the Continent had been set forth by English writers upon.
Jaw at least since Finch's Law"" at the beginning of the seventeenth
eannot be confined, either for causes or persons within any bounds ...
It hath sovereign and uncontrolled authority in making, confirming, en-
larging, restrainitlg, abrogating, repealing, reviving and expounding of
laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, . , . this being the
place where that absolute, despotic power, which must in all governments
reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms." I,
160, Also: "It can in short do everything that is not naturally impossi-
ble; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure
rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is that what the
Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo." I, 161.
65 "Not that we can believe, with some theoretical writers, that there
ever was a time when there was no such thing as society either natural or
civil. . . . This notion of an actually existing unconnected state of nature
is too wild to be seriously admitted." I, 47.
GG Compare with the foregoing: "The rights of persons considered in
-their natural capacities are also of two sorts, absolute and relative. Abso-
lute, which are such as appertain and belong to particular men, merely as
individuals or single persons; relative, which are incident to them as
members of society, and standing in various relations to each other. By
fhe absolute rights of individuals we mean those which are so in their
primary hnd strictest sense; such as would belong to their persons merely
in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether
.out of society or in it." I, 123.
671, 41.
08 Bk. I, chap. 6. "Therefore lawes positive which are directly con-
-trary to the former (the law of reason) lose their force and are no lawes
.at all. As those which are contrary to the law of nature. Such is that
of the Egyptians to turne women to merchandise and commonwealth
.ffaires and men to keepe within dores."
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century. The truth is that neither theory exactly met the situa-
tion in English law. Each of them stated a part, and an impor-
tant part, of the truth. Blackstone stated each, therefore, and
found it beyond his powers to work out a new theory which shouldt
embrace adequately all the phenomena of the legal system of the
day.
To sum up, the period from Grotius to Kant is marked by two
movements: (i) a juristic movement, proceeding upon the notion
that law is reason, in which the ideas of right and justice are
made paramount; (2) a legislative movement in which law is
thought of as emanating from the sovereign and in consequence
the idea of command comes to be paramount. In other words,.
in the eighteenth century the traditional element, while still impor-
tant, was beginning to be disturbed by the development of the7
imperative element. Accordingly jurists of the eighteenth cen-
tury were not clear as between the two theories and their formulas-
are the result of the two opposing tendencies in the law of the-
time.
Development of the Conception and Definition of Law from Kant-
to Ihering.
Nineteenth-century definitions of law are of three types. philo-
sophical, historical, and analytical. The philosophical formulas
are of two kinds, formulas written from the standpoint of natural
law, persisting from the eighteenth century, which are mostly
Rousseauist, and metaphysical formulas, which belong properly
to the nineteenth century. The historical formulas are drawn
from, the philosophical standpoint, and, indeed, usually from a
metaphysical standpoint. The analytical formulas are of three
types. French formulas after the code of 18o4 become wholly
legislative. Anglo-American formulas, for obvious reasons,
while imperative, insist more and more upon the tribunal rather
than upon the legislature as the formulating agency. The Ger-
man analytical formulas, which have come into existence since
the rise of German legislation, are for the most part social-utili-
tarian because of the influence of the Social-Philosophical School.
A new period in juristic thinking begins with Kant, who,
indeed, marks the end of eighteenth-century jurisprudence and
the starting-point of the metaphysical and in a sense the historical
jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. As has been shown in
THEORIES OF LAW
another place, 0 the chief juristic problem for Kant and his suc-
cessors was the relation of law to liberty. Kant met this problem
by working out thoroughly the purely judicial notion of justice,
the idea of an equal chance to all exactly as they are, to which the
individualism of the time and the insistence upon equality in the
maturity of law gave such prominence in the juristic thinking of
the new century. His definition of right sets forth his solution
of the problem:
"The sum of the circumstances according to which the will of
one may be reconciled with the will of another, according to a
common rule of freedom."
7 0
Savigny turned this formula of right into one of law:
"The rules whereby the invisible boundaries are determined,
within which the existence and activity of each individual gain
secure and free opportunity." 71
If we adopt an idealistic interpretation of legal history, think-
ing of the development of law as a gradual unfolding of Kant's
idea of right, this formula is a statement of the position of the
Historical School. Human experience has gradually discovered
how to determine these invisible boundaries and has expressed
what it has found in rules of law. Comparing with the two fore-
going definitions the formula of a thorough Rousseauist, writing
in a country governed by a code and in an age of legislation-
"The aggregate of the rules which provide for the force of
society to restrain those who infringe the liberty of others-"
2
it becomes apparent how strongly Kant influenced both the
Philosophical School that already existed and the Historical
School which was to come.
Savigny's school carries forward one of the two ideas which
had been contesting in jurisprudence in the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries. The element in law which the medieval jurists
had rested on theology, the seventeenth-century jurists had
derived from reason and the eighteenth-century Law-of-Nature
School had deduced from the nature of man, Savigny sought to
discover through history. In effect, therefore, the Historical
60 See my paper, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence, 25 Harvard Law Rev., 140, 151-152.
70 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre, Einleitung, §B
(1797).
7' System des heutigen r6mischen Rechts, I, §52 (1840).
72 Acollas, Introduction a l'6tude du droit, 2 (1885).
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School and metaphysical type of the Philosophical School were
closely akin, each postulating an ideal or natural law, and one
seeking to discover it through history, the other to find it through
logical development of an abstract idea.73  As the Historical
School accepted the idealistic interpretation of history, jurispru-
dence appeared to have two sides: a historical unfolding of the
idea of liberty as men discovered the rules by which to realize it,
and a logical unfolding of the principles involved in the abstract
conception. Partly through the influence of the Historical School
and partly because the traditional element was the element of
chief importance and the one in which growth was taking place
in German law at that time, the Philosophical School lost its bent
for legislation. Hence the imperative element plays no part in
the formulas of either school prior to Jhering. Moreover,
because of the idealistic interpretation of legal history, the best
definitions during the hegemony of the German Historical School
are philosophical, and for the most part metaphysical.74  During
this period men were becoming more doubtful of the efficacy of
equality as a panacea and the purely judicial idea of justice began
to drop out of the formulas of metaphysical jurists. Examples
may be seen in the definitions of Krause 3 and Ahrens.76 These
73 "Right, having entered reality in the form of law, and having become
an actual fact, stands in independent opposition to the particular will and
opinion of right, and has to vindicate itself as a universal." Hegel, Grund-
linien der Philosophie des Rechts, §219 (1820). Law is "the expression
of the idea of right involved in the relations of two or more human
beings." Miller, Philosophy of Law, 9 (1884).
74 For example-"The recognition of the just freedom which manifests
itself in persons, in their exertions of will and in their influence upon
objects." Puchta, Cursus der Institutionen, I, §6 (1841). "An aggregate of
rules which determine the mutual relations of men living in a community."
Arndts, Juristiche Encyklopidie, §1 (1850). "The sum of the conditions
of social coexistence with regard to the activity of the community and of
individuals." Pulszky, Theory of Law and Civil Society, 312 (1888). "The
sum of moral rules which grant to persons living in a community a cer-
tain power over the outside world." (Ledlie's transl.) Sohm, Institutes of
Roman Law, 4 ed., §7 (1889).
71 "The organic whole of the external conditions of life measured by
reason." Abriss des Systemes der Philosophie des Rechtes, 209 (1828).
76 "The rule or standard governing as a whole the conditi6ns for the
orderly attainment of whatever is good, or assures good for the individual
or society, so far as those conditions depend on voluntary action." Philo-
sophische Einleitung, in Holtzendorff, Encyklopfidie der Rechtswissen-
schaft, 1 ed. (1871). I have used Sir Frederick Pollock's transl., Science
of Politics, 46.
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definitions are noteworthy also because Krause and Ahrens, while
insisting upon the principle of organization, do not notice the
imperative idea.
In the United States, publicists and the type of lawyer who did
not subscribe to the prevalent historical or analytical ideas, con-
tinued the phase of eighteenth-century thought which the His-
torical School was developing into something better. The reason
for this in the case of publicists is obvious, since this eighteenth-
century juristic theory is also the classical political theory in
America, the theory of the Declaration of Independence and of
the Bills of Rights.77  Most of the American formulas from this
standpoint, however, show the influence of the Historical School,
which became very marked after 187o, as American students
began to go to Germany in increasing numbers and German ideas
took root in our universities."8 Others show the influence of the
7 A form of this theory persists also in international law. See for
example: "Law is a body of rules for human conduct within a community
which by common consent of this community shall be enforced by external
power." Oppenheim, International Law, I, §5 (1905). At first all juristic
thinking in international law was from the standpoint of natural law.
Later under the influence of English lawyers, who rejected ideas of natural
law, attempt was made to substitute the common consent of nations for the
nature of man and of society as the basis of this body of law. See
especially what is said in R. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. Div., 63. In other words, they
attempted to replace a philosophical theory with a political theory. But
the "consent" here is as much a fiction as the "agreement" in the third
definition in the next note. A nation would hardly be allowed to say that
it had not consented to what all other nations consider a rule of right and
justice, and consequently of international law, any more than an individual
would be permitted to put the theory of consent of the governed into
actual effect in the courts.
78 Some examples may be considered. "Those rules of intercourse
between men which are deduced from their rights and moral claims; the
expression of the jural and moral relations of men to one another." Wool-
sey, International Law, §3 (1871). The first half of this is pure natural
law. The second half shows the influence of the Historical School, and is
to be compared with some of the formulas of the metaphysical jurists,
e. g. Miller's ante, note 73.
Again: "The aggregate of received principles of justice." Smith,
Elements of Right and of the Law, §231 (1887). The phrase "received
principles of justice" suggests two questions. One is, how received? 'It
is not clear that the author does not mean, received by legislation. In
that event we have the Grotian idea, -which was handed down by Black-
stone. If, on the other hand, he means, received by a course of historical
dcvelopment, the Historical School would agree. But notice, secondly,
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this- line. The significant achievements of nineteenth-century
theory of law were in historical and analytical jurisprudence.
Note has been made already of the influence of the metaphysi-
cal type of the Philosophical School upon the earlier formulas
of the historical jurists. In their later formulas, the influence
of the Analytical School is no less marked. Three definitions
will suffice for our purpose:.
"The sum of the rules which fix the relations of men living in
society,-or at least of the rules which are sanctioned by the
society,--imposed upon the individual by a social .constraint. 8 0
"The rule of conduct to which a society gives effect in respect
to the behavior of its subjects toward others and toward itself and
in respect to the forms of its activity.""'
"A rule expressing the relations of human conduct conceived as
subject to realization by state force."82
that the principle received must be one of justice or, according to this
formula, it is not law. In other words, this definition attempts a com-
bination of the eighteenth-century view with the view of the Historical
School, as we have seen others attempting to combine the law-of-nature
idea with the imperative idea.
Another definition shows markedly the Rousseauist and also the
Puritan ideas of American lawyers: "A rule agreed upon by the people
regulating the rights and duties of persons." Andrews, American Law,
§72 (1900). Of course this "agreement of the people" is a fiction, unless
agreement is used in a very broad sense indeed. In truth this agreement
and Austin's command of the sovereign are the same. Each exists as to
the traditional element of the legal system by implication only. The one
author looks to an ultimate moral source, the other to the immediate prac-
tical source of the sanction upon which both have fixed their attention.
Analytical School.7" But no real advance was possible along
7 For example: "The will 6f the State concerning the civic conduct of
those under its authority." Woodrow Wilson, The State, §1415 (1898).
The idea of will here is perhaps a reminiscence of Rousseau. But the
definition strongly suggests the analytical position in asserting that the
traditional element in our law is law through the will of the State. In a
sense this is true, as we shall see when we come to the same problem in
connection with Austin's formula. But in a deeper sense it is not true.
Often the traditional element in law is imposed on the State thiough the
habitual modes of thought of the legal profession and of jurists. The
history of practice acts in nearly all American jurisdictions has shown that
it is impossible for the will of the State, as expressed through its organs of
legislation, to make headway rapidly or even consistently against a settled
juristic tradition.
80 Brissaud, Manuel d'histoire du droit Fran ais, 3 (1898).
81 Merkel, in Holtzendorff, Encyklopfidie der Rechtswissenschaft, 5 ed.,
5 (1890).
82 Wigmore, Cases on Torts, I, app. A, §3 (1911).
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The prominence given to the imperative element in each case,
directly or indirectly, should be observed. In this respect these
formulas should be compared with Savigny's definition. 3  In
the latter there is no suggostion of any imperative. There the
rules of law are thought of as determinations of the bounds of
individual activity resulting from human experience, not as rules
proceeding from the will of the State or deriving their significance
from force or constraint. Savigny thought of rules of law as
analogous to rules of language. In each case, he would say, we
practise them rather than enforce them. In contrast with this,
the more recent formulas of historical jurists insist upon sanction
through society or through the State as a social organization. The
reason for this influence of the analytical conception upon the
historical conception is not far to seek. To speak only of the
three formulas cited, Brissaud wrote in a country goveffned by a
code, where, as we shall see presently, almost all jurists were
writing definitions from the imperative standpoint. Merkel wrote
after the rise of legislation in Germany and after Jhering had
given an analytical turn to German juristic thought. Wigmore's
formula is of more interest. Alone of the three it carries for-
ward the philosophical conception of the Historical School and
shows the-influence of the Social-Philosophical School. Prob-
ably this formula marks the end of one period and the b'eginhing
of a new one in Anglo-American definitions of law. But while
it recognizes the idea of sanction it assigns thereto a very subordi-
nate place. And it is hardly an accident that a formula of this
type appears in America, where lawyers and especially law-
teachers, insist upon the traditional element almost exclusively."'
While the metaphysical and historical jurists carried forward
one of the contending ideas in the juristic thought of the prior
century, the other idea was taken up and developed by practical
jurists in France and by analytical jurists in England.' We may
begin with the French for two reasons. In the first place, as we
have seen, French juristic thinking had begun to run along impera-
tive lines in the eighteenth century, owing to the modes of politi-
8" Ante, note 71.
84 Professor Wigmore did his first juristic work in analytical juris-
prudence and, in achievement, is probably our leading analytical jurist.
His later juristic work is historical, but along with recent historical jurists,
he no doubt would adhere to one of the Social-Philosophical Schools,
insisting upon its practical or sociological side.
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cal thought in a period of absolute government. Secondly,
France was the first country of Europe to reduce her whole law
to legislative form. Consequently after i8o4 the formulas of
French lawyers are usually imperative. They define droit as an
aggregate of lois which have an imperative basis, or else define loi
only, and that from the imperative standpoint. s5  This describes
85 "The civil law is, therefore, a rule of conduct upon a subject of com-
mon interest prescribed to all citizens by their lawful sovereign. It is the
solemn declaration of the legislative power, by which it commands, under
certain penalties or subject to certain rewards, what each citizen ought
td do or not to do. or to permit for the common good of society." Toullier
Droit Civil Frangais, I, §14 (1808). "A law (loi) is a rule established
by the authority which, according to the political constitution, has the
power of commanding, or prohibiting, or of permitting throughout the
State. A law truly and properly so-called, therefore, . . . is a rule sanc-
tioned by the public power, a rule civilly and juridically obligatory. Law
(droit) is the result, or better, the aggregate or totality of these rules."
Demolombe, Cours de code Napol6on, I, §2 (1845)). "Law (loi) . . . is
a rule established by a superior will in order to direct human actions ...
The law (droit) . . . sometimes the rules of law (lois) seen in their
aggregate, or more often the general result of their dispositions." Demante,
Cours analytique de code civil, I, §§1-2 (1849). "What is law (droit)?
It is the aggregate, or rather the resultant, of the dispositions of the laws
(lois) to which man is subjected, with the power of following or of vio-
lating them. . . . Now these laws (lois) are rules of conduct established
by a competent authority." Marcade, Explication du code Napoleon, 5 ed.,
1, §1 (1859). "One may say with Portalis that law (la loi) is a solemn
declaration of the will of the sovereign upon an object of common inter-
est." Laurent, Principes du droit civil Frangais, I, §2 (1869). "Obligatory
rules of conduct, general and permanent, established for men by the
temporal sovereign." Vareilles-Sommi~res, Principes Fondamentaux de
Droit, 12 (1889). "Law (droit) is the aggregate of precepts or laws
(lois) governing the conduct of man toward his fellows, the observance
of which it is possible, and at the same time just and useful, to assure by
way of external coercion." Baudry-Lacantinerie, Pr6cis du droit civil, 10
ed., I, §1 (1908).
Note the effect of recent social-utilitarian and sociai-psychological
ideas upon the last. formula. The problem of why so much that is set
as law fails to be law in action has received much attention from socio-
logical jurists. See my papers on The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence, 25 Harv. Law Rev., 140, 154, 489, 515. The author attempts
to take this matter into account. He attempts to explain the failure of
written law to become law in action by saying that the rule which so fails
cannot be enforced or cannot be enforced justly and usefully and so is not
enforced. With espect to this introduction of etiforceability as an ele-
ment in the idea of law, compare the second stage of the Anglo-American
analytical formula, infra. The older analytical view would be that the
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exactly what appeared to be in France after the codes. Later
jurists perceived that the traditional element was playing a very
large, if not a controlling part in the interpretation, development
and application of the codes, and consequently in the actual law
administered in the tribunals. Hence not only did eighteenth-
century ideas persist,86 but the ideas of the metaphysical and his-
torical jurists found a place in practical French treatises,8 7 and
ultimately there was a revival of philosophical jurisprudence.8
Nevertheless the traditional element was obscured for a long time
by the form of French law.
While German jurists were gradually coming back to the
imperative idea, En-glis jurists were engaged in getting away
from it, The century from Blackstone to the Judicature Act
was one of legislation. The growing-point of our law has been
shifting slowly but surely to legislation for a long time. Never-
theless the dominant element is still case law, and common-law
legislation is still a mere outline, to be filled in by a judicial gloss.,,
In consequence, legislation was so active in the nineteenth century
that English jurists could not overlook the imperative element and
yet the other element was too conspicuous to make it possible for
an exclusively imperative theory to remain current. It would
seem that parliamentary sovereignty in England turned the scale
and brought it about that almost all English jurists adhered in
varying degrees to the Analytical School, while American jurists
in the second half of the nineteenth century were mostly of the
Historical School because of the judicial power over unconstitu-
tional legislation in this country and the resulting supremacy of
the traditional element.
rule is law because it is the command of the sovereign and that the jurist
has nothing to do with the question how far it is put into action. If it
is not enforced it would be said the administrative machinery is at fault.
Obviously the Social-Philosophical and Sociolcgical Schools have com-
pelled the analytical jurist to broaden his outlook.
86E. g. Mourlan, Rip6titions 6crites sur le premier examen de code
Napoleon, 8 ed., I, §§2-4 (1869).
S7E. g. Huc, Commentaire du code civil, I, §§1-10 (1892), seeking to
deduce a complete system of principles of law from the idea of equality.
88 See my paper, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological jurispru-
dence, 25 Harv. Law Rev., 140, 159.
s9 See my paper, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. Law Rev.,
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At the beginning of the legislative reform movement in English
law, we find Bentham, the founder of the science of legislation,
saying, in a treatise on the principles of legislation, that "a law is
either a command or the revocation of one."90  His disciple,
Austin, writing when the legislative reform movement was in
full career and was producing all manner of artificial changes in
the law, so that such parts of the law as remained in their original
condition did so, as it were, by the grace of Parliament, worked
out this idea vigorously in all its consequences and founded his
system upon it. The general and almost blind adherence to
Austin's doctrines at one time and the scarcely less general and
perhaps at times little less blind repudiation which came as a
reaction, have obscured his true position in the history of juris-
prudence. In many respects he marks the end of a period rather
than a starting-point. But the exactness and severity with which
he summed up and restated what had long been the English theory
of law-.. made an issue on which the Historical School could and
did join. Blackstone had said already that law was a "rule of
action dictated by some superior and which the inferior is bound
to obey"; likewise that it was "a rule of action dictated by some
superior being."92  But along with these statements Blackstone,
as we have seen, laid down with no apparent thought of incon-
sistency, the most extreme doctrines of natural law. Austin saw
the inconsistency and was never weary of pointing it out. Having
to choose between the two ideas, in view of the condition of
English law at the time, Austin naturally inclined to the impera-
tive theory, and laid down its general principles almost in the very
words of Blackstone. A law, in the most general sense, is, he
says, "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being
by an intelligent being having power over him. '0 3 jurisprudence,
he says, has to do with rules set by men to men, provided they are
established by determinate political superiors.0 4  He requires a
state as a condition of positive law; for a law, being a command,
must proceed from a definite source and must be sanctioned 5
Accordingly he defines positive law as "the aggregate of rules
00 Principles of Morals and Legislation, 330 (1789).
91 See Hobbes' definition, ante, note 53.
92 Commentaries, I, 38, 39.




set by men as politically superior to men as politically subject.""6
This is simply a thorough carrying out of the notion we have
traced from the beginnings of jurisprudence in the writings of
jurists living in periods of legislative activity. Its defects are
now well understood. Not only does it fail when applied to the
law of archaic communities, but it requires an over-ingenious
theory of implied command to account for the large traditional or
customary element still to be found in developed systems. Never-
theless it must be admitted to represent what law is largely coming
to be, especially where the common law itself is in force by the
express terms of a statute.97  The point most directly vulnerable
is the notion that rules of law must be prescribed or set by the
sovereign. We may understand such a doctrine when we find
it still put forward by one who believes that rules of morals are
to be taken from a spiritual sovereign and rules of law from a
temporal sovereign.9  We may expect to find it still asserted by
those who cling to eighteenth-century dogmas and refer the
source of all things to some agreement or consent on the part of
the "people." '9  But to one who investigates the actual facts of
existing systems it is impossible. The will of the State, or, if
one likes, the will of the people is not always expressed in impera-
tive form. The State may b passive. It may suffer old prac-
tices to continue or may continue to protect or require them,
without any express declaration on the subject. Rules of law
are administered by the courts, and the courts have been estab-
lished by the State.- This does not mean, however, that the State
has established or prescribed the rules.
]6Jbid., 98.
o See for instance, Ala. Code 1907, §12; Ark. Kirby's Dig. 1904, §§23,
624; Cal. Gen. Laws 1904, Act 631; Col. Rev. St. 1908, §6295; Fla. Gen.
St. 1906, §59; Ga. Rev. Code 1911, §1; Ind. Burns' Rev. St. §236; Md. Bill
of Rights, Art. 5; Mo. Rev. St. 1909, §8047; Mont. Rev. Codes 1907, §6213;
Neb. Comp. St. chap. 15 a; Nev. Comp. L., §3095; N. Y. Const. Art. I, §16;
N. C. Pell's Rev. St. §2258; S. D. Civil Code, §6; Tex Sayles' Civ. St.
§2258; Utah, Comp. L. 1910, §2488; Vt. Pub. St. 1906, §1221; Va. Const.
Schedule, §1; Wash. Rem. & Bal. Ann. Codes 1910, §143; W. Va. Const.
Art. VII, §21; Wis. Const. Art. XIV, §13; Wyo. Comp. St. 1910, §3588.
Cf. Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, 2; Rattigan, jurispru-
dence, §2; Brissaud, Manuel d'histoire du droit Frangais, 21; Stephen,
Digest of the Criminal Law, xi.
O9 Vareilles-Sommi~res, Principes fondamentaux de droit, 12.
99 Andrews, American Law, §72. See ante, note 10.
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These considerations must have led in time to an overhauling
of Austin's theories had nothing happened to brifig them suddenly
in question. But contact of English lawyers with a living body
of archaic law in India gave England a Historical School of jur-
ists and hastened the result. Hence Holland (188o) made a
distinct advance in substituting the idea of enforcement by the
sovereign. - 01 The next improvement was to limit the formula to
those rules enforced in the administration of justice. 10 ' Finally,
we owe to Salmond a suggestion which serves tersely to reconcile
the analysis of modern systems with the facts of legal history.
He defines law as "the rules recognized and acted on in courts of
justice."'11 2 If we substitute or for and, we have a formula which
accords also with the circumstances of archaic law, since before
the rise of the State as the active agent in putting down private
war, law is something recognized in the administration of justice;
and it continues to be merely recognized until the State becomes
strong enough to take it up and enforce it. International law
to-day is a system recognized by states. We may hardly say
that its rules for the government of the relations of states with
each other are enforced. In this connection, the ideas of the
Historical School are much nearer the truth. The rules of inter-
national law are practised rather than enforced. In other words,
an imperative theory which may be made to fit- the 'civil law of
modern states will not fit international law.
Thus it will be seen that the Anglo-American analytical formula
has gone through three stages. In the first stage, the imperative
100 "A general rule of external human action enforced by a sovereign
political authority." Jurisprudence, chap. 3.
101 "The law of every country . . . consists of all the-principles, rules
or maxims enforced by the courts of that country as being supported by
the authority of the State." Dicey, Private International Law as a Branch
of the Law of England, 6 Law Quart. Rev., 3 (1890). "The law or lavs of
a society are the rules in accordance with which the courts of that society
determine cases, and by which, therefore, the members of tat soc* t are
to govern themselves ,\and the circumstance which distingui t.dese rules 
from other rules for conduct, and which makes them the law, is the fact
that courts do act upon them." Gray, Definitions and Questions in Juris-
prudence, 6 Harv. Law Rev., 24 (1892). "The sum of the rules admin-
istered by courts of justice." Pollock and Maitland, History of English
Law, Introduction (1895).
102 jurisprudence, §5 (1902). Compare his earlier statement: "The
aggregate of principles or rules recognized or acted on by the State in the
administration of justice." First Principles of jurisprudence, 77 (1893).
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theory was perfected and conflicting eighteenth-century ideas
were eliminated. 3 In the second stage, through the influence of
the Historical School, enforcement by the State was substituted
for enactment as the significant mark of law..24 In the third
stage, enforcement by tribunals was substituted for enforcement
by the State.)
A noteworthy feature of the formulas in what has been called
the third stage of- the Anglo-American analytical theory, is the
insistence upon enforcement by the courts; insistence that the
courts are the real makers of the law.T' This insistence upon the
r6le played by the court in determining what is law would be
impossible except under the Anglo-American legal system, where
our doctrine of case law and precedent make the court the all-
important force in law-making. We say a rule is law because
the courts enforce it. Continental Europe has been wont to
say the courts enforce the rule because it is law. Obviously a
103 In addition to Austin's definition, supra, see the following which
represent the first stage: "A command proceeding from the supreme
political authority of a State and addressed to the persons who are the
subjects of that authority." Amos, Science of Law, 48 (1874). "The
general body of rules which are addressed by the rulers of the political
society to the members of that society, and which are generally obeyed.'
Markby, Elements of Law, §9 (1871)./ "A law is a command; that is to
say it is the signification by a law-giver to a person obnoxious to evil of
the law-gi 'er's wish that such person should do or forbear to do some
act, with an intimation of an evil that will be inflicted in case the wish be
disregarded." Poste, Gaius, 2 (1871).
104 "Rules of conduct defined by the State as those which it will en-
force, for the enforcement of which it employs a uniform constraint."
Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, I, 8 (1886). "The sum of
the rules of justice administered in a State and by its authority.'/Pollock,
First Book of Jurisprudence, 17 (1896). "The aggregate of rules admin-
istered mediately or immediately by the State's supreme authority, or regu-
lating the constitution and functions of that supreme authority itself; the
ultimate sanction being in both cases disapproval by the bulk of the mem-
bers of that State." Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, 172 (1883).
105 This has been stated in its extreme form by Professor Gray: "And
this is the reason why legislative acts, statutes, are to be dealt with as
sources of law, and not as part of the law itself, why they are to be
co-ordinated with the other sources which I have mentioned. kit has been
sometimes said that the law is composed of two parts,--legislative law and
judge-made law, but in truth all the law is judge-made law. The shape
in which a statute is imposed on the community as a guide for conduct is
that statute as interpreted by the courts." Gray, Nature and Sources of
Law, §276.
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great deal depends upon whether the courts and the legal profes-
sion are trained in the one view or the other. Our courts assume
a freedom which Continental courts do not. Hence a theory which
may seem to us the only correct theory is quite incomprehensible
to Continental jurists. Perhaps nothing could make more clear
the extent to which juristic theory with respect to the nature of
law depends upon the legal system which the particular jurist
sees before him.
Theories of Law Since Ihering.
More recently the shifting of the growing-point of German law
to legislation has made itself felt in jurisprudence in a renewed
insistence upon the imperative element in German definitions of
law. As has been said, Jhering was the leader in this move-
ment.1"' He made the needed corrections in the older imperative
theory and brought together the philosophical and the analytical
conceptions as Savigny had reconciled the philosophical and the
historical conceptions. °0 After Jhering the imperative element
came to be quite as marked in German formulas as in French and
English formulas.""8 Indeed the situation in Germany since the
new code is quite the same as that in France after i8o4.
1o Jhering insisted particularly upon sanction. "A legal proposition
without legal compulsion behind it is a contradiction in itself; a fire that
burns not, a light that shines not." Zweck im Recht, 3 ed., I, 322 (1877).
107 Jhering's formula is: "The sum of the rules of constraint which
obtain in a State." Zweck im Recht, 3 ed., I, 320.
108 "The purpose of all law is a determinate external behavior of men
toward men. The means of attaining this purpose, wherein alone the law
consists, are nomes or imperatives." Bierling, Juristische Prinzipienlehre,
I, §3. "But one must bear in mind that the final basis of all law lies in
-the power of the State. . . . Enacted law and customary law are to be
carried back to this same power, the one as expressed, the other as tacit
will thereof." Czyhlarz, Institutionen, §4. See Thon, Rechtsnorm und
sbjektives Recht, §§1-3 (1878). Thon says: "The whole law of a com-
munity is nothing but a complex of imperatives."
Compare also the insistence upon sanction, in one way or another, in
recent German definitions. "The rule armed with force first gives us the
conception of law. That which does not possess the guarantee lying in
force cannot be called law." Lasson, System der Rechtsphilosophie, 207
(J882). "Law is the ordering of the relations of life guaranteed by the
general will." Dernburg, Das bfirgerliche Recht des Deutschen Reichs und
Preussens, I, §16 (1902). "Law is the ordering (Ordnung) based upon
autonomous government in a state of civilization." Berolzheimer, System
der Rechts und Wirthschaftsphilosophie, III, §17 (1906).
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Thus it appears that the growth of legislation as the chief
agency in formulating the law has led to an emphasizing of the
imperative element in all recent definitions. In England, as the
Analytical School arose while the legislative energy of the reform
movement was at its height and the Historical School came later,
jurists have been tempering ultra-imperative analytical formulas"
to bring them into accord with the results of historical research.
In America, we have been tempering them so as to bring them
into better accord with the obvious r6le of the courts in the
making of our law. In Germany, where the Historical School
came earlier and waged its war with philosophical rather than
with analytical antagonists, metaphysical formulas have had to be
made over to accord with the everyday experience of those who
live under thd jurisdiction of active legislatures. For the moment,
the conceptioi of the Analytical School is almost as thoroughly
established as was once the idea of a law of nature and later the
theory of the Historical School. As the "capital fact in the
mechanism of modern law is the energy of legislatures,"' 10 9 we
may expect that jurists will insist more and more upon the impera-
tive side of law. Even writers on ethics have been influenced by
this modern predominance of enacted law."0 In Italy alone did
the theory of natural law continue to flourish despite a code.'"
But, as we have seen, in the history of jurisprudence periods of
legislation and codification, in which the imperative theory of law
has been current, have always been periods of stagnation. The
law has lived and grown through juristic activity under the
influence of ideas of natural right and justice or of reasonable-
ness, not force and not sovereign will, as the ultimate source of
authority. Hence, if there were no counter movement visible,
we might well regard the well-marked swing, of the pendulum
toward the imperative side of the law in juristic theory as an ill
omen.
Here the Sociological School has an opportunity, Realizing
that a final answer to the question, what is law ' is impossible,
100 Maine, Early History of Institutions, Lect. XIII.
110 "We must define laws to be rules of conduct laid down by a right-
ful authority, commanding within the limits of their authority." Sidgwick,
Methods of Ethics, 6 ed., 296.
111 Lioy, Philosophy of Right, (Hastie's transl.) II, 39-392. But a
decadence was remarked at the end of the nineteenth century. Carle, Vita
del diritto, 2 ed., §204 (1890).
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since the thing to be defined is living and growing and therefore
subject to change, the most conspicuous representative of the
Social-Philosophical School abandons that question and goes
behind it to define the legal order (Rechtsordnung) in which law
results and for which it exists.' 12 The means of attaining this
legal order, or, as we should put it, the means of administering
justice, may vary. The agencies which determine the content
of the body of principles by which it is regulated may be this or
that. They may be command and sovereign will or reason and
juristic science, or custom and tradition. But the end has been
before men from the beginning of legal evolution. By appealing
from the particular form of law which is now current to the ulti-
mate conception of the legal order, the new school points out the
road for future development in jurisprudence. It keeps before
us that law is not an end but a means. A school which studies
it as a social mechanism'1 ' will do no little service if it but deliver
us from the condition of dry rot which juristic thought has hith-
erto contracted in periods of enactment and codification, and pre-
serve or restore the juristic ideals of reason and justice, which for
a time we seemed fated to lose or to forget.
The Relation of Theories of Law to the Problem of Rule and
Discrefion.
Comparison of the development of juristic theory of law with
the development of the forms of law and study of juristic theory
of law in connection with the formulating agencies in law for the
time being, show that there is no one absolute form of law or
absolute type of law-making, but that the traditional and the
imperative elements in law, the juristic and the political agencies
in law-making may each find a place, greater or less according to
the circumstances of time and country. Moreover a recognition
that reason and juristic science on the one hand and command and
sovereign will on the other hand are but means toward the dis-
covery and formulation of principles for the administration of
justice leads to the conclusion that the end deserves our study
quite as much as the means and that the means are to be studied
112 "The legal order is an adjustment through coercion of the relations
of human life arising in a social manner from the social nature of man."
Kohler, Einfiihrung in die Rechtswissenschaft, §1 (1902).
I's "A mechanism in the service of the good." Paulsen, Ethics (Thilly's
transl.) 627.
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chiefly with reference to the manner and extent of their achieving
the end. Thus the result of the long conflict in juristic theory
between the idea of reason and the idea of authority suggests that
we must dig deeper than the jurists who have gone before and
must, as the social-philosophical jurists have begun to do, consider
law with reference to its end and with reference to its results in
the direction of that end, and not merely in and of itself. This
insistence upon the legal or jural order rather than upon law, in
whiph juristic theory of law has clminated has a special impor-
tance for American political and juristic thinking.
In Am erica a new conflict has arisen, analogous to the conflict
in eighteenth-century juristic thought, and brought about by a
like cause. Our classical juristic theory and our classical political
theory are wholly out of accord. And while our law books go
on laying down both, 114 as naively unconscious of their incon-
sistency as was Blackstone in laying down side by side Coke's
theory of the sovereignty of Parliament and the Grotian theory of
natural law, in practice lawyers adhere tenaciously to the one1 '
while laymen assume the other almost as a matter of course.110
For the popular theory of sovereignty, what one may call the
classical American political theory, is quite as firmly rooted in the
lay mind as the eighteenth-century theory of a fuhdamental law
of eternal and absolute validity is rooted in the legal mind. The
layman is taught this political theory in school, he reads it in the
newspapers, he listens to it on the Fourth of July and from Chau-
tauqua platforms and he seldom or never hears it questioned. In
consequence he is as thoroughly sure of it as is the lawyer of his
juristic theory. This conflict between the legal and the political
theory of law-making between the professional and the popular
theory of law, is a prime cause of misunderstanding of courts
and of popular agitation against judges and lawyers. For if the
lawyer is moved to stigmatize all that does not comport with his
114 Robinson, Elementary Law, §1; Robinson, Elements of American
Jurisprudence, §§1-8; Fishback, Elementary Law, §§2, 6, 7, 9; Andrews,
American Law, chaps. I, VI-VIII, X; Smith, Elementary Law, §§1-8, 16-19.
115 In addition to the many examples in 4, note 13, compare: "In other
words, the reason must exist antecedently to the law and the law is but
the sanction of society added to the inherent force of the reason." E. V.
Abbott, in 10 Harv. Law Rev., 219.
126 Willoughby, Nature of the State, 199-204; Woodrow Wilson, The
State, 1457; Leacock, Elements of Political Science, 100-104.
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doctrine as lawlessness, the people at large are moved to stigma-
tize all that does not comport with their theory as usurpation.
While the American lawyer, as a rule, still believes that the
principles of law are absolute, eternal, and of universal validity,
and the common law teaches that principles of decision must be
found, not made, the people believe no less firmly that law may
be made, and that they have the power to make it. While to the
lawyer the State enforces law because it is law, to the people law
is law because the State, reflecting their desires, has so willed.
While to the lawyer law is above and beyond all will, to the people
it is but a formulation of the general will. Hence it often happens
that when the lawyer thinks he is enforcing the law, the people
think he is overturning the law. While, for example, the lawyer
thinks of popular action through the State as subject to legal
limitations running back of all Constitutions, and merely reas-
serted, not created, thereby, thp people think of themselves as the
authors of all Constitutions and limitations, and the final judges
of their meaning and effect. This conflict between the lawyer's
theory, as he gets it from the eighteenth century, and the political
theory, likewise of pighteenth-century origin, becomes most acute
with respect to the common-law doctrine of supremacy of law.
But it leads also to conflict over the relation of common law to
legislation.1"' Both of these absolute theories must be abandoned.
There is truth in each in that each describes an element in all
legal systems which the other has never been able to put down,
although each in turn has been able more than once to push the
other into the background for the time being. As jurists recog-
nize this and instead of attempting to establish the one or the
other as the necessary ultimate source of all law.or of all authority
of legal rules, seek rather to work out the relation of e.ch to the
end of law, we may expect much of the friction between courts
and people in America to abate.
But there is a side to the conflict between reason and authority
in juristic theory which is not so easily disposed of. For this
- conflict is closely related to the fundamental problem of rule and
discretion, the problem of administration of justice by law and
administration of justice by magistrates. The new attitude
toward theories of law must lead us to work out the exact rela-
117 See my papers, The Law and the People, University of Chicago
Magazine, III, 1 (1910); Democracy and the Common Law, Case and
Comment, XVIII, 447 (1912).
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tion of the traditional element of law and the imperative element,
of judicial empiricism and conscious law-making, of reason and
science on the one hand and of command and will on the other
hand, to this problem. For the real problem is here. Juristic
discussion of the nature of law has come to be futile, except as a
guide to the legal ideas of the time, because it has failed to con-
nect the qnestion, what is law? and the controversy as to common
law and legislation, with the equally old problem of law and
morals, the distinction of law and equity, the discussion of the
province of court and jury, the controversy as to fixed rule or
wide discretion in procedure, the movement for individualization
of punishment and the Continental controversy over application
of legal rules, as in large measure a part, along with them, of the
larger problem of rule and of discretion in the administration of
justice. That problem is too large to be discussed here. It is
enough to suggest that inheritance and succession, interests in
property and the conveyance thereof, and matters of commercial
law, where the creation, incidents and transfer of obligations with
respect to which the social interest in security of transactions is
especially strong, have proved at all times a fruitful field for
effective legislation. But where the questions are not of interests
of substance, but of the weighing of human conduct and passing
upon its moral aspects, legislation has accomplished little. No
codification of the law of torts has achieved any measure of suc-
cess. Indeed modern codes are content with significantly broad
generalizations.11 8 In the United States, succession is everywhere
a matter of statute, and no one questions that the statutes operate
well. More and more our commercial law is codifying, and our
law of property, with respect to which in a modern community,
certainty is an imperative requirement, will no doubt afford a like
opportunity for uniform legislation. On the other hand, in those
parts of the law where we have to do more than delimit interests
of substance "1" and devise means of securing them, not only do
318 See French Civil Code, art. 1382; German Civil Code, 823, 826. 'It
is not an accident that the Anglo-American law of torts has completely
established itself in Louisiana or that jurisprudence-i. e. judge-made law
-has more weight here than anywhere else in French law.
11 The influence of the nineteenth-century insistence upon property
may be seen in Korkunov's definition of law as the delimitation of inter-
ests. General Theory of Law (Hastings' transl.), 6. Probably the exag-
gerated insistence upon property in Anglo-American juristic thinking is
reflected in some measure in the English preference for the imperative
theory of law.
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we meet with little legislation 12 0 and that confined to generaliza-
tions of doubtful practical value, but in the administration of our
traditional judge-made or jurist-made law we find ourselves com-
pelled to leave a wide margin of discretion, as for example in the
standard of the reasonable man'12 in our law of negligence and
the standard of the bories ac diligens paterfamilias applied by
the Roman law and especially by the modern Roman law to so-
many questions of culpa where the question is really one of good
faith; and all attempts to cut down this margin by hard and fast
rules prove futile. Obviously the more flexible traditional
element, with its greater power of adjustment and capacity for
more rapid growth, may best deal with this part of the law, which
inherently does not admit of complete justice by application of
fixed rules. Here the trained reason and disciplined judgment
of the judge are our assurance that causes will be decided on
principles of reason and not according to the chance dictates of
caprice. Here, consequently, reason and juristic science must
co6perar'e with judicial experience in discovering and defining the
general standards which are to be applied liberally according to
the circumstances of each case. In the other part of the law,
where human conduct is not involved directly, and where fixed
rules for the exact delimitation of interests are the prime requisite,
the will of the State, declared authoritatively in advance, conduces
to the end of law and has always proved an effective and desir-
able form of law.
Roscoe Pound.
Harvard Law School.
720For example, the Anglo-Indian codes leave the law of torts
itntouched. Note also that the common law insists upon its doctrine of
stare decisis chiefly in the two cases of property and commercial law.
Lindsay v. Lindsay, 47 Ind., 283; And v. Magruder, 10 Cal., 282; Black,
Law of Judicial Precedents, §79, 76, p. 242.
121 As has often been pointed out, this is not a legal standard at all.
Holmes, Comnmon Law, 110-111; Bigelow, Torts, 673.
